This paper investigates how financial, trade, institutional and political liberalization policies have affected financial efficiency in Africa. It uses updated data to appraise second generation reforms in order to gather fresh evidence and derive more updated policy 
Introduction
The recent financial crisis has brought renewed interest in the fierce debate about the lofty goals of liberalization policies and their implications for financial development, especially in developing countries. Some analysts are of the stance that the global financial crisis has dramatically unraveled the downsides of politico-economic globalization, as many emerging markets and developing economies (which had to grapple with surges in capital flows earlier in the last decade) are now experiencing a sharp reversal of those inflows due to the crisis (Kose et al., 2011; Asongu, 2012a) . Financial mechanisms that have eased the economic downturn have resurfaced concerns about the appealing ambitions of financial globalization and their implications for growth and volatility, with particular emphasis on developing countries. The premise for this strand of fears is that, according to theoretical postulation the benefits of financial liberalization are expected to the higher in developing countries 2 .
The current wind of politico-economic globalization began in the 1980s with soaring cross border financial flows among industrial economies as well as among developing countries. This was eased by the liberalization of capital controls in many of these countries since it was widely anticipated that increased cross-border flows would bring higher appeals in terms of better capital allocation and improved possibilities of international risk-sharing.
Many economic policy makers have been of the view that, these benefits ought to be high for developing countries that have more volatile income growth and tend to be relatively capitalpoor (Kose et al., 2006) . With the surge in financial inflows, came a spade of currency and financial turmoils in the late 1980s and 1990s. This pattern set the course for many scholars to 2 From a theoretical standpoint, financial globalization should ease the efficient international allocation of capital and promote international risk sharing. These benefits should be much higher for developing countries because they are relatively capital scarce and labor rich. Hence, access to foreign capital should help them increase investment and growth (Asongu, 2012a) . Moreover, developing countries have more volatile output than advanced industrial countries which increases their potential welfare gains from international risk sharing (Kose et al., 2011). 4 begin advocating that developing countries which opened-up their capital accounts have been more vulnerable to crises (and consequently more adversely affected) than their industrial counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 2007; Asongu, 2012a) . These developments have ignited a fierce and heated debate among academics and practitioners of liberalization policies. While the debate over the positive gains from trade liberalization has tilted towards a consensus (Kose et al., 2006) , that on other liberalization policies (especially capital account openness) has intensified and become more polarized (Asongu, 2012a) .
In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked on a chain of structural and policy adjustments at financial, economic and political levels with the goal of given impetus to economic growth as well as improving overall economic and financial efficiency (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992) . In the first generational reforms, adopted policies included: reducing direct government intervention in bank credit decisions, abolishing explicit control on the pricing and allocation of credit, relaxing of control on international capital movements and, allowing of interests rates to be market determined. Second generational reforms targeted structural and institutional constraints, notably: improvement of the legal, regulatory, supervisory and institutional environments, restoring of bank soundness and, rehabilitation of financial infrastructure . Unfortunately, despite over two decades of financial reforms, African economies have not made significant strides in tackling the substantially documented excess liquidity issues (Saxegaard, 2006; Founda, 2009; Asongu, 2012b) .
Accordingly, the weight of this empirical evidence on surplus liquidity adequately justifies the temptation of questioning the financial allocation efficiency gains of the reforms. While a substantial bulk of the literature has examined the impact of financial reforms on financial development (Cho et al., 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; , but for Asongu (2012b), the financial efficiency dimension has not been tackled from a fundamental allocation efficiency standpoint (Ataullah et al., 2004; Saxegaard, 2006; Al-Obaidan, 2008; 5 Kiyato, 2009; Kablan, 2010) . Perhaps the main hurdle in investigating the linkage between liberalization of financial markets and capital allocation efficiency lies in the fact that, the efficiency of capital allocation is not directly observable (Kukenova, 2011, p.1) .
In light of the above, the present study steers clear of past works from four standpoints: the conception and definition of efficiency, the focus on Africa, employment of a plethora of liberalization policy variables and, the use of updated data. Firstly, contrary to authors that have conceived financial allocation efficiency from three mainstream perspectives (the efficiency of decision making units through Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 3 , Overall Economic Efficiency (OEE) with respect to the product of technical and scale efficiencies 4 or cost and profitability orientated views) 5 , the concept adopted in the current work reflects how financial intermediaries (banks) fulfill their fundamental role of transforming mobilized deposits into credit for economic operators. In so doing, the issue of surplus liquidity is rightly calibrated. Secondly, we are focusing on a continent that is suffering from the paradox of 'excess bank liquidity and dire investment needs'. Thirdly, by employing a plethora of liberalization policies (financial, trade, institutional, political ...etc.), we present a broad and exhaustive picture of the nexuses between liberalization policies and financial efficiency. Lastly, the use of much recent data provides findings with more focused and updated policy implications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly provides an insight into the debate. Measurement issues and estimation strategy are discussed and outlined 3 Refer inter alia to Ataullah et al. (2004) who have used DEA to investigate the technical and scale efficiencies of financial intermediaries in India and Pakistan. 4 For example see Al-Obaidan (2008) who has used a composite indicator for the efficiency of the banking industry in the Gulf region to show (with deterministic and stochastic analyses) that openness enhances technical efficiency. 5 Refer to the African financial efficiency literature (Kiyato, 2009; Kablan, 2010) . From a broader perspective, four main indicators of this stance on efficiency are discussed in Demirgüç-Kunt & Beck (2009) . They include: the ratio of bank deposits (which measures the extent to which savings can fund private credit), the net interest margin (which is the accounting value of a bank's net interest revenues as a share of its total assets), overhead cost (or the accounting value of the bank's overhead cost as a share of its total assets) and, cost/income ratio (which assesses overhead costs relative to revenues). While the last three are profitability oriented, our conception of efficiency is captured by the first (Asongu, 2012b) .
6 respectively in Section 3. Empirical analysis and corresponding discussion are covered in Section 4. We conclude with Section 5.
Brief insights into the debate on financial allocation efficiency
The decision on whether to embrace liberalization policies as means of facilitating the efficient allocation of financial resources and reaping the benefits of international risk sharing is not without controversy. From a broad standpoint, there are two different narratives on the wisdom of liberalization as a policy choice for developing countries in their attempt to improve allocation efficiency.
The first strand that supports the benefits of 'allocation efficiency' substantially relies on the seminal work of Solow (1956) on the predictions of standard neoclassical growth. In this neoclassical model, liberalization policies (especially capital account openness) facilitate a more efficient allocation of resources and produce all kinds of appealing effects. Consistent with this strand, resources flow from capital abundant developed countries (where the return for capital is low) to capital-scarce developing countries (where the return of capital is high).
The trickle of resources to developing countries reduces their cost of capital, triggering a temporal improvement in investment and growth that raise living standards permanently (Obstfeld, 1998; Fischer, 1998; Rogoff, 1999; Summers, 2000; Asongu, 2012a) . Partly motivated by the potential gains from incorporating 'allocating efficiency' arguments into their economic policies, many developing countries from Santiago to Seoul have implemented some form of liberalization during the past quarter century (Asongu, 2012a) .
In the second strand, 'allocation efficiency' is conceived, viewed and depicted as a account (if at all they exist) are not really apparent, but the costs are manifestly evident through recurrent emerging-market crises (Rodrik, 1998) . At the dawn of the sub-prime financial crisis, the claims that recent financial engineering has generated large gains sounded less plausible and it is becoming increasingly clear that domestic financial markets will be more scrutinized (Sodrik & Subramanian, 2009) . With regard to this narrative, even leaving financial crises aside, on the international front it is increasingly crystal-clear that the benefits of financial liberalization have been hard to find 6 . This narrative further argues that; financial globalization has not generated increased investment or higher growth in developing countries. Accordingly, economies that have progressed most rapidly have been those that have relied less on capital inflows. Hence, globalization policies have felt short of smoothing consumption and/or reducing volatility. According to this strand, the evidence based on the phenomenon today is indirect, speculative and ultimately unpersuasive (Asongu, 2012a) . This antithesis has concluded with the recommendation that, it is time for a new paradigm on liberalization policies that recognizes that more is not necessarily better. 8
Data and Methodology

Data
We assess a sample of 28 African countries with annual data from African Development Indicators ( Consistent with Asongu (2012b) , the dependent variable measuring financial allocation efficiency seeks to capture how mobilized deposits are transformed into credit for economic operators; hence, it addresses the concern of excess liquidity. In quest for robustness, we employ two indicators: banking-system-efficiency and financial-systemefficiency (respectively 'bank credit on bank deposits: Bcbd' and 'financial system credit on financial system deposits: Fcfd').
In this study, we distinguish among five types of liberalization policies: financial, has been subject to discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009) legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; size of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and; regulation of credit, labor and business.
Control variables include: inflation, government expenditure, economic prosperity (GDP growth), human development, foreign aid and population growth. Consistent with recent African finance literature, we expect inflation to decrease financial efficiency (Asongu, 2011a; Asongu, 2012c) while economic prosperity and population growth should improve it (Asongu, 2011a) . Human development should also improve efficiency whereas the effects of government expenditure and development assistance are contingent on the quality of institutions. Accordingly, government expenditure and development assistance destined for the improvement of the financial sector that is not tainted with corrupt practices will improve efficiency.
Details about the summary statistics (with presentation of countries), correlation analysis (showing the nexuses among key variables used in the paper), and variable definitions are presented in the appendices. The 'summary statistics' (Appendix 1) of the variables used in the panel regressions reveals that, there is quite some variation in the data utilized so that one should be confident that reasonable estimated linkages should emerge.
The object of the correlation matrix (Appendix 3) is to mitigate issues resulting from overparametization and multicolinearity. Based on a preliminary assessment of the correlation coefficients, there do not appear to be any disturbing issues in terms of the relationships to be estimated. Appendix 2 reveals definitions and corresponding sources of the variables.
Methodology
Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Due to the high correlation among various good governance indicators, one might criticize the redundancy of some information. Hence, we use principal component analysis (PCA) to reduce the dimensions of government-effectiveness, rule of law, corruption-control, regulation quality, voice & accountability and political stability. PCA is a widely used statistical technique applied to reduce a larger set of correlated variables into a smaller set of uncorrelated variables called principal components (PC) that account for most of the information in the original data set. In the selection of the PCs, the criteria applied to determine how many common factors to retain are taken from Kaiser (1974) and Jolliffe (2002) . Therefore, only PCs with an eigenvalue greater than one are retained. As shown in Table 1 , the first PC is appropriate since it has an eigenvalue of 4.705 and represents more than 78% of information in the institutional indicators combined. The first PC will subsequently represent the institutional liberalization index (Instidex). 
Estimation technique
When compared with cross-country analysis, estimation with dynamic panel data has some important upsides and one downside (Demirgüç-Kunt & Levine, 2008) . On the positive side: (1) it makes use of both time-series and the cross sectional variations in the data; (2) in cross-country regressions, the unobserved country-specific effect is part of the error term, so that correlations between the error term and the exogenous variables results in biased estimated coefficients. More so, in cross-country regressions, if the lagged dependent variable is included among the explanatory variables, the country-specific effect is certainly correlated with the regressors. A measure of controlling for the presence of the unobserved countryspecific effect is to first-difference the regression equation to eliminate the country-specific effect and, then make use of instrumental variables to control for endogeneity. Addressing the endogeneity concern is the second positive side of dynamic panel data analysis. Uncontrolled endogeneity can substantially bias estimates and, lead to misleading inferences and unhealthy policy recommendations. Dynamic panel data analysis addresses this endogeneity issue by using lagged values of exogenous variables as instruments.
The principal downside linked with dynamic panel data analysis is using data-averages over shorter time spans. Consequently, the estimated results reveal short-run impacts and not long-term effects, which should be kept in mind when interpreting and discussing results. The redeeming feature however is that, the use of average data mitigates short-run disturbances that may loom substantially large.
The dynamic panel regression model is expressed as follows:
Where 't' stands for the period and 'i' represents a country.
FE is financial efficiency;  an error term.
Estimates will be unbiased if and only if, the explaining variables above are strictly exogenous. Unfortunately, this is not the case in the real world because: (1) while they have a substantial incidence on financial efficiency, the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out because the efficiency in allocation of financial resource in an economy also has some bearing on the plethora of regressors; (2) the regressors could be correlated with the error term ( 7 We have already discussed the expected signs of control variables in the Data section.
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However Eq. (2) presents another concern; estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is still bias because there remains a correlation between the lagged endogenous independent variable and the error term. In order to tackle this new concern, we estimate the regression in differences jointly with the regression in levels using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation. The technique uses lagged levels of the regressors as instruments in the difference equation and lagged differences of the regressors as instruments in the level equation, hence, exploiting all the orthogonality conditions between the lagged dependent variables and the error term. Between the difference GMM estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991) and the system GMM estimator (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998) , we go for the latter with respect to Bond et al. (2001, 3-4) 8 .
In specifying the dynamic panel system estimation, we opt for the two-step GMM because it corrects the residuals for heteroscedasticity. In the one-step, the residuals are considered to be homoscedastic. The assumption of no auto-correlation in the residuals is relevant as past lagged variables are to be used as instruments for the endogenous variables.
Moreover, the estimation depends on the hypothesis that the lagged values of the dependent variable and other independent variables are valid instruments in the regression. When the error terms of the level equation are not auto-correlated, the first-order auto-correlation of the differenced residuals should be significant while their second-order auto-correlation: AR (2) should not be. The validity of the instruments is investigated with the Sargan over-identifying restrictions (OIR) test. In summary, the main arguments for using the system GMM estimation are that: it does not eliminate cross-country variation, it mitigates potential biases 8 "We also demonstrate that more plausible results can be achieved using a system GMM estimator suggested by Arellano & Bover (1995) and Blundell & Bond (1998 Bond et al. (2001, pp. 3-4) .
of the difference estimator in small samples and, it can control for the potential endogeneity of all regressors (Asongu, 2012d) . 
Empirical analysis
Presentation of results
Based on the results presented in Table 2 Inflation decreases efficiency (Asongu, 2011a; Asongu, 2012c) while economic prosperity (Asongu, 2011a) and population growth increase it.
Discussion of results
We now devote space to discussing the results. Firstly, we have found that financial liberalization is not pro-financial efficiency with the magnitude of KAOPEN higher than that of FDI. The two financial liberalization measures differ principally from the view that, KAOPEN measures de jure capital openness by accounting for regulatory restrictions on capital account transactions, while FDI is capital account openness. Hence, KAOPEN tends to increase as capital markets are more liberalized; so with FDI, KAOPEN increases. The greater detrimental effect of KAOPEN confirms China's capital account opening strategy. In fact, very recently, China's de facto openness despite its de jure closeness has been subject to much discussion in research and policy making circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009 ).
Secondly, the fact that exports improve efficiency is logical in the perspective that, despite the surplus liquidity issues witnessed by African financial institutions, credit would easily be granted for export-oriented activities because it is a direct source of income with less credit risk. Indeed there is a wide consensus on this positive effect of trade (Kose et al., 2006) .
Thirdly, the fact that institutional liberalization is pro-efficiency while the political liberalization effect is insignificant is also logical. Institutional adjustments (corruptioncontrol, government effectiveness, political stability, voice & accountability, rule of law and regulation quality) were part of second generational reforms that aimed to improve economic and financial efficiency. Conversely, the effect of democracy cannot be too apparent because elections are multi-annual; hence, it is not directly linked to financial development. Another explanation that is consistent with recent finance-democracy literature is the time and level hypothetical benefits of democracy in financial development (Asongu, 2011b) . According to Asongu, democracy in Africa has important effects on the degree of competition for public offices but less significant effects in comparison with autocracy on policies of financial development because, democracies in the continent are young (time hypothesis) and weak (level hypothesis).
Fourthly, the fact that freedom to trade decreases (improves) financial (banking) system efficiency means that traders operating with semi-formal and informal financial institutions have less access to credit facilities for their activities.
Fifthly, the fact that economic freedom facilitates the transformation of mobilized financial resources (deposits) into credit for economic operators, could be due to the substantial weight of its legal structure component (see definition in Section 3.1 and correlation with Instidex in Appendix 3): which is undoubtedly positively associated with the institutional impact already covered above.
Conclusion
This paper has investigated how financial, trade, institutional and political Justifications for these nexuses are provided. 
Appendices
